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ABSTRACT
As technology continues to advance, there is increasing concern about individuals being left be-
hind. Many businesses are striving to adopt responsible design practices and avoid any unintended
consequences of their products and services, ranging from privacy vulnerabilities to algorithmic bias.
We propose a novel approach to fairness and inclusiveness based on experimentation. We use
experimentation because we want to assess not only the intrinsic properties of products and algorithms
but also their impact on people. We do this by introducing an inequality approach to A/B testing,
leveraging the Atkinson index from the economics literature. We show how to perform causal
inference over this inequality measure. We also introduce the concept of site-wide inequality impact,
which captures the inclusiveness impact of targeting specific subpopulations for experiments, and
show how to conduct statistical inference on this impact.
We provide real examples from LinkedIn, as well as an open-source, highly scalable implementation
of the computation of the Atkinson index and its variance in Spark/Scala.
We also provide over a year’s worth of learnings – gathered by deploying our method at scale and
analyzing thousands of experiments – on which areas and which kinds of product innovations seem
to inherently foster fairness through inclusiveness.
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Meg Garlinghouse, Ya Xu, Stuart Ambler, James Eric Sorenson, Bari
Lemberger, Parvez Ahammad, Sofus Mackássy, Steve Lynch, as well as the entire LinkedIn Data Science Applied
Research team, and the Computational Social Science team for valuable contributions and comments.
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1 Introduction
Motivation
Businesses are increasingly striving to adopt responsible design practices to avoid unintended consequences of their
products and services. Examples range privacy vulnerabilities [7] to claims of algorithmic bias against minorities
[16], such as women and ethnic minorities [12]. A growing literature on algorithmic fairness [1, 9, 4, 5] focuses
on guaranteeing that algorithms provide equal representation of various demographics, or that their error rates are
consistent across different demographics.
However, focusing exclusively on algorithms and their properties can lead one to miss two crucial points:
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First, how people react and interact with a product is as important as the product itself. Instead of only focusing on
whether an algorithm is representative or fair, we should also focus on the outcomes. For example, an algorithm may
seem to treat men and women similarly, but if it results in women getting disengaged, it may be an undesirable outcome.
Second, the focus on protected categories can be too narrow, especially in the age of the internet. In particular, many
products now have a “network” or “social” component and a user’s experience may be determined by who they know:
share this with your friends, post this to your community, refer your friends for employment opportunities. . . In other
words, many features often risk increasing the gap between people with strong networks and people without them.
While “network strength” is not a legally protected category, this is still something worth paying attention to. Worse,
how many more such categories may we all be overlooking? We need a way to be alerted if a feature we build has an
inequality impact, even if it is not between categories we are explicitly monitoring.
Therefore, even if a product may seem to have been designed in a “responsible” or “fair” manner, it can still drive a
wedge between different groups of users, in particular groups of users that a company may not be explicitly monitoring
(for example, between people who have a powerful social network, and those who do not).
An A/B testing approach to fairness
We propose a novel approach to help address these concerns. We use it as a complement, not a substitute, to more
traditional algorithmic bias approaches. We leverage experimentation, which, instead of characterizing a feature in the
void, measures the effect it has on users. In particular, we measure inequality impact of all new features and product
changes (whether they are algorithms, UI changes, or infrastructure changes, for example) and flag experiments that
have a notably positive or negative inequality impact. In essence, along with asking, "what would be the total number
of sessions or contributions on our platform" if feature A (vs. B) were rolled out?, we also ask "if feature A were to be
rolled out, what would be the share of the top 1%, in terms of engagement and contributions? Would inequality go up
or down?" This combination of concepts from measures of inequality, drawn from the economics literature, with A/B
testing provides us two distinct advantages.
First, instead of just measuring inequality we can trace it back to its causes: a specific set of features and product
decisions. We can ask: which of our products is making the ’rich’ richer?
Second, compared to classical algorithmic fairness approaches, it also gives us another advantage: it helps us identify
features that increase inequality without having to rely only on explicitly protected categories. A feature that increases
the gap between any two classes of users is likely to be detected.
We then apply this method to every single experiment that LinkedIn has conducted over the past year and analyze the
ones with the highest inequality-increasing or inequality-reducing impact.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First, we provide an introduction to our inequality impact
measurement method, relying on an adequately parametrized Atkinson index. Second, we show how this method
can be combined with A/B testing, comparing a treatment and a control group via a difference in Atkinson indices.
We discuss the variance of this difference and statistical inference, as well as extrapolation to the effect beyond the
experiment. Third, we describe our process for driving large-scale business impact using this method, discussing
scalable implementation as well as organizational processes needed. Fourth, we share a specific example of a LinkedIn
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experiment that was identified by this method as having a strong inequality impact. Finally, using the thousands of
experiments we have analysed, we share our high-level findings of the types of interventions that generally seem to be
inequality-increasing and decreasing, as well as the best use cases for this approach.
2 The Atkinson Index for fairness
We start by describing the Atkinson index as a measure of inequality, its desirable properties, as well as how to
parametrize it.
2.1 A highly stylized example
The most common way of characterizing a dataset is using its average. Most experimentation platforms primarily report
the average effect of a new feature for a given population segment. They compute the average of business metrics
for users who were exposed to the new feature (often called treatment group), and compares them to the average for
members who were not (control group). The main benefit of this method is its simplicity. It also easily allows us to
extrapolate the total effect on business metrics if the new product were to be given to all users (i.e., our website has 1M
sessions today; it would have 1.05M sessions if we rolled this feature out).
However, exclusively focusing on the average effect may hide significant disparities between users. In particular, it
could conceal significant disparities that are being introduced by the new feature. For example, imagine a website that
only has ten users, which all visit the site once a day (1 session/user). We depict this on the left side of Figure 1. An
initiative that doubles sessions could do so in many ways: it could either double every user’s sessions (top of the figure),
or more than quadruple some user’s sessions and decrease others (bottom). Yet that difference is typically not readily
visible on traditional platforms, which only show averages. If a company needs to tell these two types of scenarios
apart, then a method is required in order to automatically detect interventions that may increase inequality. This is the
case for LinkedIn, whose vision is to create economic opportunity for every member of the global workforce.
2.2 Properties of the Atkinson Index
First introduced by Atkinson [2], the Atkinson index is a standard measure of inequality that economists frequently use
for country-to-country comparisons of income distributions [3]. Given a sample x1, . . . , xn, representing a metric (such
as sessions, page views, job applications, . . . ) for a group of users indexed by i, and an inequality-aversion parameter .
It is computed as follows for  6= 1:
A(x1, . . . , xn) = 1−
( 1n
n∑
i=1
x1−i )
1
1−
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi
. (1)
Intuitively, for a fixed  , a low value of A is obtained when all individuals have almost the exact same metric value.
When this is exact, the Atkinson index is zero. A higher value reflects more inequality. The  parameter can be tuned to
reflect the inequality preferences of a decision maker, as will be shown in the next section.
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Figure 1: Two products with the same average impact, but different individual effect patterns.
That Atkinson index has several desirable properties [2] for our application, namely:
It is non-negative and is equal to zero only if all individual metrics are the same. This is helpful in comparing
distributions to the “pure equality” baseline, as shown in the above figure.
It satisfies population replication axiom: if we create a new population by replicating the existing population any
number of times, the inequality remains the same. This is particularly helpful because companies tend to grow, and
the simple fact that the number of users is growing should not change the inequality index, unless actual inequality
increases are happening at the same time.
It satisfies the principle of transfers: any redistribution (i.e., reducing a user’s metrics to increase the metric of another,
lower-ranking user) results in a decrease of the Atkinson index, as long as this intervention does not change their
rank in the distribution. This can be useful to specifically assess the impact of “redistribution” experiments, such as
redistributing attention on the feed [17].
If all metrics are multiplied by a positive constant, the index remains the same: this is useful because it allows us to
compare inequality of distributions across different time horizons meaningfully. For example, if all users have the same
number of sessions every day, the inequality will be the same, whether measured as daily, weekly, or monthly sessions.
It is subgroup decomposable: Any Atkinson index can be decomposed as an average of indices for subpopulations.
This is useful when an experiment, for example, only targets a specific population, but we would like to understand its
inequality effect on the population as a whole. [8, 13]
It is parametrizable: different levels of inequality may be acceptable for different decision-makers, different use cases
or metrics, and we can parametrize inequality aversion using .
5
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It is scalable: Looking at the formula above, one can see that the Atkinson index lends itself to distributed computation,
using map-reduce or Spark, for example.
2.3 Parametrizing the Atkinson Index (choosing )
The only parameter for the Atkinson index is epsilon, which measures a decision-maker’s inequality aversion. A good
way to parametrize this is through choice experiments: presenting individuals with a series of choices between two
possible simple distributions, and asking them which one they prefer. In particular, we simulate cases where reducing
inequality is possible, but at a cost: the total of the metric must be reduced (see figure 2 for an illustration). Eliciting the
acceptable cost level maps to the decision maker’s epsilon.
Following [6], we can model the Atkinson index as a discount factor for the total of the metric. If U is the utility of the
decision-maker, we have
U(T,D, ) = T (1−A(,D)) (2)
T is the total of the metric, and D is the distribution. Notice that if there is no inequality, the inequality index is zero,
and the decision maker’s utility is equal to the total of the metric. In other words, for each level of inequality, there is an
equally distributed equivalent total, which the decision-maker would consider equivalent.
In particular, we simulate simple, two-individual cases. In the two-individual case, the Atkinson index can be written as
follows:
A(y1, y2, ) = − 2
(y1 + y2)
(
1
2 y
−+1
1 +
1
2 y
−+1
2
)( 1−1 ) + 1
Equivalently, it can be rewritten as a function of the total and the share of the richest individual:
AS(T, s1, ) =
2
(T (s1 − 1)− Ts1)
(
1
2 (−T (s1 − 1))−+1 + 12 (Ts1)−+1
)( 1−1 ) + 1 (3)
We use this fact for our choice experiments: If decision makers truly regard high levels of inequality as problematic, it
follow that they should be willing to sacrifice some amount of core business metrics (say, sessions), in order to see
inequality be reduced. Therefore, we provide an individual with a prospective total T1, a prospective share of the richest
s1, and provide an alternative s2, leading to less inequality. We then elicit the the total T2 that would make these two
scenarios equivalent, which leads us to compute the individual’s , as a solution to:
(1−AS(T1, S1, )) = (1−AS(T2, S2, ))T2
T1
Figure 2 illustrates an example of a choice experiment.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of a choice experiment to elicit 
2.4 Interpreting an Atkinson index
Once the epsilon has been set, we can interpret the Atkinson index as a discount factor on the total of the metric
according to the individual’s preferences, as shown in equation 2. In short, as outlined in the previous section, it
measures how much of a core business metric (say, sessions) one would be willing to give up in order to see that metric
be equally distributed between members.
Translating this core interpretation into an A/B testing context, this implies that when we see a +0.01 Atkinson impact
of an experiment, we can read this as "someone with my inequality preferences (i.e., my epsilon) would rather give
up 1% sessions than have this feature be rolled out". This simple interpretation is quite helpful when interpreting the
magnitude of an inequality impact.
3 Inequality in A/B testing
We now formally discuss how to leverage the Atkinson Index in an A/B testing context. In an online experiment, we
can measure the Atkinson index for the treatment group and the control group and decide whether they are significantly
different. This provides a way to determine whether the treatment product increases inequality amongst users.
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3.1 Difference in means
Consider an A/B test with two variants, A and B, of the product. To compare the relative inequality impact of the
two versions, we compute the Atkinson index for both; denote them by AA and A
B
 . We then compare A
A
 and A
B
 to
determine if there is a statistically significant difference between them. If we know the distribution of AA and A
B
 , we
can use the standard Neyman-Pearson [14] hypothesis testing framework to test the null hypothesis that the two variants
are similar in terms of inequality impact. That is,
H0 : A
A
 = A
B
 .
To measure the inequality impact of an experiment, we use a difference in means between treatment and control:
δˆ = AT −AC
This can simply be read as the inequality increase or decrease that the new feature introduces, and can be interpreted as
outlined above.
3.2 Variance and Inference
In order to decide whether an observed difference in inequality between treatment and control is significant, we need to
compare it to its expected variance under the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two.
Variance of one Atkinson index
To carry out inference, it is crucial to have an approximation of the distribution of A. The distribution of the Atkinson
index can be approximated using the central limit theorem and the delta method. The following theorem gives the
asymptotic distribution.
Theorem 1. For a sample x1, . . . , xn, independently distributed according to a distribution F , and a fixed aversion
parameter , the Atkinson index A(n) is asymptotically normally distributed. Specifically, the following holds
√
n
(A(n) −A(F )
σn
)→ N(0, 1),
where
A(F ) = 1−
(∫
x1−dF (x)
) 1
1−∫
xdF (x)
and
σ2n = Σ̂11 ×
( 1n
∑n
i=1 x
1−
i )
2
1−
(1− )2 ( 1n∑ni=1 xi)2 − 2Σ̂12 ×
( 1n
∑n
i=1 x
1−
i )
1+
1−
(1− ) ( 1n∑ni=1 xi)3 +
Σ̂22 ×
( 1n
∑n
i=1 x
1−
i )
2
1−(
1
n
∑n
i=1 xi
)4
(4)
8
FAIRNESS THROUGH EXPERIMENTATION - PREPRINT - FEBRUARY 17, 2020
Table 1: Ratio of bootstrap variance to theoretical variance, by sample size and Atkinson epsilon. Bootstrap variance is
computed over 1000 runs; these numbers are further averaged over 200 runs.
N 0.01 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.99
1e+02 0.950 0.951 0.969 0.972 0.985
1e+03 0.983 0.979 0.983 0.991 0.991
1e+04 0.993 0.996 0.997 0.996 0.997
1e+05 1.004 0.994 0.999 1.003 1.006
1e+06 1.001 0.993 0.999 0.999 0.992
for
Σ̂11 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
x2−2i − (
1
n
n∑
i=1
x1−i )
2,
Σ̂21 = Σ̂12 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
x2−i − (
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi)× ( 1
n
n∑
i=1
x1−i ),
Σ̂22 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
x2i − (
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi)
2.
The theorem is proved in the appendix.
Variance of the difference between treatment and control
Vˆδ =
σ2nT
nT
+
σ2nC
nC
T = δˆ/Vˆδ
We then compare T to the critical values of a normal distribution.
3.3 Comparison to bootstrap variance
Theorem 1 provides the asymptotic variance to the Atkinson index. For a finite-sample perspective, we compared it
to bootstrap simulations on real LinkedIn metrics. The bootstrap variance is typically within ±4% of the theoretical
asymptotic variance. Table 1 below shows a simulation on log-normally distributed synthetic metric data, with different
sample sizes and values of . All bootstrap variances are estimated using 1000 runs, and then further averaged over 200
runs. We show the variability over these 200 runs in figure 3.
3.4 Extrapolating to company-wide inequality impact
A standard analysis of treatment impact on inequality compares the Atkinson index in the treatment and control group,
and whether the difference is statistically significant. This indeed is a crucial piece to understanding the inequality
impact of the treatment. However, it does not capture the full picture. Imagine our member base can be decomposed
into three groups. Group A has very little engagement. Group B has more, and group C is the most highly engaged.
Now consider an experiment that targets only groups B and C, leaving A out of the experiment completely. Imagine
that this experiment is only successful at increasing engagement for group B, and has no actual impact on group C.
9
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Figure 3: Ratio of 1000-run bootstrap variance to theoretical variance, by  and sample size. This exercise was repeated
200 times, resulting in a distribution of ratios showed in the boxplots
This treatment reduces inequality within the experiment population (B+C): the engagement of B went up, and the
engagement of C remained constant. However, if we consider the whole member base (A+B+C), treatment probably
increases engagement inequality, as it increases the gap between the already engaged users (B+C ) and the others(A).
Therefore, we also need to consider the impact of the treatment on inequality in the broader member base, rather than
only on the population targeted by the experiment.
3.5 Site-wide estimation of the Atkinson index
One way to measure the broader impact on inequality is to estimate the change in Atkinson index if we were to fully
ramp the treatment (100% ramp) to the segment of members the experiment is targeting.
Hypothetically, assume that we were to ramp treatment to 100% in the segment it’s targeting. We would like to compare
this scenario to the case where we ramp control to 100% in the same segment. The two hypothetical scenarios are
illustrated in Figure 4, where each color corresponds to a variant.
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Figure 4: Two universes before and after releasing a product.
To estimate the impact in each of the two scenarios, we can extrapolate the impact in the targeted segment based on the
A/B results, and use the existing results for rest of members to get site-wide results. Define
Xrest = total value of the metric X for members NOT in the targeted segment
Yrest = total value of the metric X1− for members NOT in said segment
nall = total number of members (entire population)
nseg = number of targeted members (size of the targeted segment)
Xc = total sum of the metric X for the control group
Yc = total sum of the metric X1− for the control group
nc = number of people in control
Xt = total sum of the metric X for the treatment group
Yt = total sum of the metric X1− for the treatment group
nt = number of people in treatment
Then we can estimate the site-wide values in the control universe using
Xswc = Xrest +
nseg
nc
Xc
Y swc = Yrest +
nseg
nc
Yc
Aswc = 1−
[Y swc
nall
]1/(1−)
Xswc
nall
.
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Similarly for the treatment universe, we have
Xswt = Xrest +
nseg
nt
Xt
Y swt = Yrest +
nseg
nt
Yt
Aswt = 1−
[Y swt
nall
]1/(1−)
Xswt
nall
.
Finally, we can compare the site-wide inequality impact of treatment and control by comparing Aswt to A
sw
c . The
relevant asymptotic variance for that comparison is shown in section A.2 of the appendix.
4 Using this method at scale for business impact
4.1 A highly scalable implementation on Spark
In order to fully leverage inequality A/B testing, we built a system that could handle the large scale of A/B testing at
LinkedIn: thousands of concurrent experiments, millions of users, and dozens of metrics of interest. In this section, we
outline the design of this system.
Single experiment
In order to compute an Atkinson index on an arbitrarily large number of users, a distributed approach is needed.
Thankfully, the Atkinson index can be decomposed as a function of sums of powers of metrics, making parallelization
possible. One can first raise each user’s metrics to various powers of  and 1− , then sum across all nodes, and compute
the final index. To this end, we make available as simple Spark-SQL user-defined aggregation function (UDAF) for
Apache Spark. For simple use cases, it can be leveraged as follows: first, the aggregator needs to be initialized val
atkinsonAgg = new AtkinsonAggregator(epsilon) ; then it can simply be applied to the data as follows:
val inequalityStatistics =
dataFrame.select(atkinsonAgg($”metric”)).
This UDAF can simply be copied or can be used as part of our open-source package.
Multi-experiment
To perform large-scale A/B comparisons of inequality indices, we resorted to a scalable Spark Dataset aggregation
approach. From a list of all currently running experiments and metadata, we initialize a large number of buffers. These
buffers are designed to store all the primitives necessary for the computation of an Akinson index and of its variance.
These buffers are then updated in parallel while reading the metric and treatment assignment data and merged. The
buffers are finally converted to Atkinson indices and variances, and compared pairwise to perform statistical inference.
We outline the multi-experiment algorithm as a flowchart in Figure 5, and also make it available open-source.
12
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<memberId, {(
experiment1, variant1), 
(experiment2, variant2), ...)}>
Treatment Assignment Data
memberId
experimentId
variantId (treatmentId)
Metric Data
memberId
metricName
timeStamp (day)
metricValue
Experiment Metadata
experimentId
startDate
endDate
variantList (variant, 
percentAssigned)
FILTER eligible 
experiments
JOIN
GROUP BY memberId GROUP BY memberId
Scalable Dataset Aggregation Compute Atkinson Indices, perform 
all pairwise Treatment/Control 
comparisons, return impacts 
and-values
Initialize Dataset 
aggregation buffers
Keep only experiments where there 
exists a 
control group (i.e. not 100% treatment)
<memberId, {(day1, (metric1, 
metric2)), (day2, (metric1, 
metric2))...}>
<experimentId, startDate, 
endDate, N, sum_x, sum_x, 
sum_x_2, sum_x_?, ... >
For each row of the data (1 row= 1 memberId):
for each experiment the member is involved in:
for each day the experiment lasts:
for each metric x:
update the experiment buffer as follows:
N+=1
sum_x += x
sum_x2 += x2
sum_x? += x? 
sum_x1-? += x1-? 
sum_x2-? += x2-?
sum_x2-2? += x2-2?
Then: merge all buffers from different executors, by 
summing all their elements
(atkinson, atkinsonVariance) = f(N
sum_x ,sum_x2 , sum_x? ,sum_x1-?, x1-?, 
sum_x2-?, sum_x2-2? )
(impact, pValue) = f(atkinson_treatment, 
atkinson_variance_treatment, 
atkinson_control, 
atkinson_variance_control)
Figure 5: Flowchart of scalable inequality impact computation. This is a simplified view.
In particular, it omits the fact that experiments are often split into population segments, and we also iterate over those. It also omits
several sanity checks performed along the way, such as checking for Sample Size Ratio Mismatch (i.e. when an experiment is
configured to have a certain percentage of the population treated, but significantly different percentage is recovered from the tracking
data.) Finally, the computation of site-wide inequality impact follows a very similar logic, but is not shown for simplicity
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Figure 6: The LinkedIn process to review experiments flagged by this method
4.2 Organizational review process
Computing the inequality impact of all experiments is, of course, just the beginning. In order to have an impact on
the user experience, we also outlined an organizational process, based on two primary mechanisms. First, we rely on
positive recognition and reinforcement of initiatives that reduce inequality in core metrics. Second, we propose an alert
system for initiatives (experiments) that increase inequality, especially when such increases might be unintentional or
avoidable.
Every month, we analyze all experiments that have been run. As outlined above, the main pieces are a large-scale Spark
job, and a simple UI. We then select the most impactful experiments – the ones that had the highest absolute value
inequality impact – for further review. A core team reaches out to experiment owners to get as much context as possible
about the exact nature of the intervention tested in the experiment, and about its primary intent. A monthly meeting is
then set up with the experiment owners, where we share the inequality result with them, learn from them whether it was
intended or not, and decide on next steps. We save all the results and relevant context, in order to build an extensive
knowledge base about which types of interventions increase or decrease inequality between our members. There can be
many follow-ups, depending on the finding: if the experiment reduces inequality, the owners are typically encouraged to
hear it. They often invest more in the same direction, as was the case for our leading example in this paper, described in
section 5. If the result is an increase in inequality, we typically recommend a deep dive to understand the causes. This
often entails trying to discover if the inequality is being created along a particular dimension, i.e., between discernible
groups of users: for example, users of different countries, or users with different network strength (see A.3). Our review
process is illustrated in Figure 6.
5 Example of an experiment: Instant job notifications
A new feature on LinkedIn, named Instant Job Notifications, informs active job seekers of new job postings. Within a
few minutes of the time a new job is posted, Instant Job Notifications uses the Automated Sourcing algorithm to find
seekers for whom this job is a good fit, and sends them a push and an in-app notification. Our analysis shows that it
14
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Figure 7: Impact of Instant Job Notifications, multiplied by a χ21 distributed random number for confidentiality.
both decreased inequality in engagement and job applications, but also reduced the gap between job applications and
engagement of well-connected members versus poorly connected members. For an explanation of how we distinguish
well-connected member, see Appendix A.3. This is for two main reasons: first, members with poorer networks were
less likely to be referred to these jobs or to hear about them through their network. Second, members tend to self-censor
if they see that a job opening has already received applications, and this is more likely to be true for particular group of
users, like women. Sharing the job opportunity before it had received a high number of applicants made users more
likely to apply.
The feature increased the number of job applications and the chance of the application receiving interaction from the
employer. More importantly for us, from the job posters perspective, this featured decreased inequality in the number
of applications received between job postings. That is, the jobs that previously received very few applications started
receiving more. Figure 7 shows the impact of Instant Job Notifications on some of the relevant metrics. The numbers
are multiplied by a χ21 distributed random number.
6 Analyzing thousands of experiments: what we learned so far
Fairness through experimentation should not only be about setting guardrails with A/B testing and detecting experiments
that could be potentially damaging to our members. It is also about finding inspiration to create a more inclusive product.
Contrary to “top-down” fairness criteria or ex-ante requirement, we try to learn from the thousands of colleagues and
engineers as they experiment on the features they are building. Through this, we are compiling a knowledge base of
types of interventions that seem to reduce inequality, so that it may be used as a guide for development of our next
products. In the last section of this paper, we share a few of the things we have been able to learn so far.
6.1 Metric-neutral interventions are often not neutral for everyone
In many situations, teams may try to implement “neutral” interventions: for example, when performing a back-end
infrastructure change, or when trying to “boost” or promote a specific product on the platform while making sure no
other product suffers. The principal method of monitoring this neutrality is looking at a treatment-control comparison
of the average impact (often called lift) in the experimentation platform. However, even if no average impact is detected,
there is often an inequality impact. In other words, metrics are not affected on average, but some users are. This makes
inequality a critical aspect to monitor in such experiments, as “neutral” should mean neutral for everyone. We have
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seen examples of this while trying to promote a specific feature: it had no negative impact on other elements of the site
on average, but increased engagement inequality, and was eventually canceled.
6.2 Notifications are a powerful tool
Notifications have a strong impact on inequality of engagement, as they are a powerful tool to bring the least-engaged
members to the site. Similarly, reducing notifications to the most engaged members reduces engagement inequality.
New Member onboarding
Making sure more people benefit from LinkedIn requires adding new members, and helping them familiarize themselves
with the platform and its value proposition to them. To that end, the quality of the onboarding process is of paramount
importance, as new members have a high chance of dropping off a new service or platform in the first few days. We
analyzed an experiment that tried to accompany new, onboarding members better, through the use of nudges and
notifications. Before that experiment, many new members did not receive any notifications. In this experiment, new
members now received 1-2 push notifications during their first week - encouraging them to take key actions to build
their network and create value for themselves. This had a positive impact on average engagement, but also on inequality
of engagement, since it primarily helped members who were at the highest risk of dropping off the site.
Notification batching for highly engaged members
For optimal user experience, it may be necessary to batch notifications together. For example, if a member receives 55
actions on their post, we can either send her 55 notifications, or bundle them together in progressively: send one for the
first like, then another one for ten likes, and so on. We analyzed a similar experiment and saw that notification batching
reduced inequality, as it primarily affected the most engaged members.
6.3 Site speed and availability matters to inclusiveness
We found that many interventions relating to site speed and reliability had a disproportionately positive impact on the
least engaged members, and reduced inequality. This makes sense, as those may be members with slower devices and
connections.
The low-bandwidth LinkedIn app
Several experiments on the low-bandwidth LinkedIn app showed a strong positive impact, both on average engagement
and on inequality in engagement. The low-bandwidth LinkedIn app targets members with slower network speeds or
slower devices. Enabling that feature, or adding features that brought the low-bandwidth experience closer to the main
experience (like enabling hashtags, for example), had positive inclusiveness effects.
6.4 On social network platforms, social capital matters for inclusiveness
Once an inequality impact (positive or negative) is found, we seek to understand it, in particular by asking whether
we can identify two or more groups that are being affected deferentially by the experiment. Note that we care about
inequality whether or not it can be summarized as a differential impact on different groups, but identifying groups
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helps with interpretation. We have repeatedly found that a member’s network strength (i.e., her social capital, how
well-connected she is) often has an impact on how much value she can get out of a social network.
6.5 Both positive and negative inequality impacts are often unintended
Throughout over a year of experiment review meetings and learning from experiment owners, we often found that the
inequality impact we surfaced was unintended. On occasion, it was positive, and on others, negative. Designers may
often think about users in an idealized fashion: as a representative, average user that does not actually exist. This may
pose inclusiveness challenges, as it runs the risk of leaving users who do not resemble the idealized average behind.
7 Conclusion
We have shared a new approach to responsible design, complementary to mainstream approaches to algorithmic fairness.
It emphasizes inequality measurement in experimentation, to focus on final impacts of algorithms (including user’s
behavioral responses), rather than on the properties of the algorithms only. It is highly scalable and deployed throughout
LinkedIn. It has allowed us to identify and reinforce inequality-reducing initiative and is a valuable way for companies
to monitor potentially unintended consequences of their experiments.
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A Appendix
A.1 Variance of the Atkinson index
Proof. Proof of Theorem 1 Note that we can write
A(x1, . . . , xn) = f(
1
n
n∑
i=1
x1−i ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi),
for f(x, y) = 1− x
1
1−
y . We will use the CLT for (
1
n
∑n
i=1 x
1−
i ,
1
n
∑n
i=1 xi) along with the delta method to find the
asymptotic distribution of A(x1, . . . , xn). Let µα denote the population mean of xα. Then, the CLT asserts
√
n
(
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
x1−i ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi)− (µ1−, µ1)
)
→ N ((0, 0),Σ) ,
where the limiting covariance matrix can be consistently estimated as
Σ̂11 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
x2−2i − (
1
n
n∑
i=1
x1−i )
2,
Σ̂21 = Σ̂12 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
x2−i − (
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi)× ( 1
n
n∑
i=1
x1−i ),
Σ̂22 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
x2i − (
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi)
2.
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The delta method asserts that
√
n
(
f(
1
n
n∑
i=1
x1−i ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi)− f(µ1−, µ1)
)
→ N (0, σ2),
where σ2 = (∇f(µ1−, µ1))TΣ(∇f(µ1−, µ1)). We can use sample plug-in estimates of Σ, µ1, and µ1− to obtain an
estimate of σ, as
σ2n = Σ̂11 ×
( 1n
∑n
i=1 x
1−
i )
2
1−
(1− )2 ( 1n∑ni=1 xi)2 − 2Σ̂12 ×
( 1n
∑n
i=1 x
1−
i )
1+
1−
(1− ) ( 1n∑ni=1 xi)3 +
Σ̂22 ×
( 1n
∑n
i=1 x
1−
i )
2
1−(
1
n
∑n
i=1 xi
)4 .
(5)
Law of large numbers guarantees that σn is a consistent estimator of σ. This along with Slutsky’s theorem proves the
result.
A.2 Variance for Site-wide impact
The variance of the SWA can be estimated similarly. In fact, it is given by the same formula as 5, except that the sample
averages are replaced with sitewide extrapolation defined in section 3.4, and the variance is scaled appropriately to
reflect the relative size of the eligible population compared to the entire member-base.
σ
2
n = (
nseg
nall
)
2×
Σ̂11 × (Y sw/nall)
2
1−
(1 − )2 (Xsw/nall)2
− 2Σ̂12 ×
(Y sw/nall)
1+
1−
(1 − ) (Xsw/nall)3
+ Σ̂22 ×
(Y sw/nall)
2
1−
(Xsw/nall)
4
 . (6)
A.3 An important demographic cut: network strength
Once we know an experiment impacts inequality, it is natural to look for the underlying reason. One standard approach
is to compare the impact of the experiment on different cohorts of members. We take this approach in this section
with a focus on member attributes that describe members’ network on LinkedIn. There are various ways to extract
member features from networks. Motivated by [18], [15] [11], [10], on the power of weak ties we use structural network
diversity, defined below, as a proxy for social capital. [15] establishes that structural network diversity has a measurable
positive on members’ career outcomes. In particular, when the structural network diversity increases, people are more
likely to change jobs. Structural network diversity is defined through the local clustering coefficient, introduced by [18],
and is defined as follows.
A graph G = (V,E) formally consists of a set of verticesV (all LinkedIn members) and a set of edges E between
them (e.g. all the connections between members). An edge eij connects vertex vi with vertex vj . The neighborhood of
vertex i is defined as Ni = {vj ; eij ∈ E}. In our case, for a specific member i, this is the set of all her connections. The
number of connections is given by ki = |Ni|. Local clustering coefficient for vertex vi is the number of connections
between the neighbors of vi, i.e. members of Ni, divided by the total number of such possible connection. That is
mathematically equal to
di =
2|{ejk; vk, vj ∈ Ni, ejk ∈ E}|
ki(ki − 1) .
Structural network diversity is defined as 1− di.
We divide members into three buckets based on the structural network diversity score, the bottom 20% are the members
with low social capital and the top 20% are the members with high social capital.
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A.4 Scalable computation of the Atkinson Index and its variance Using Spark-SQL
We share the simple single-metric implementation of the Atkinson Index computation here, for illustrative purposes.
This code is directly usable by any spark user as outlined in section 4.1. The code for the multi-experiment, multi-metric
scalable aggregation is significantly too large to fit in this appendix, but is available upon request as an open-source
project. This code is written for legibility, rather than low-level optimization (we could make fewer calls calls to
Math.pow(), for example.)
i m p o r t o rg . apache . s p a r k . s q l . e x p r e s s i o n s . M u t a b l e A g g r e g a t i o n B u f f e r
i m p o r t o rg . apache . s p a r k . s q l . Row
i m p o r t o rg . apache . s p a r k . s q l . t y p e s . _
/∗∗ a Spark User−Def ined a g g r e g a t i o n f u n c t i o n (UDAF)
∗ t o compute t h e A t k i n s o n Index and i t s v a r i a n c e
∗
∗ @param e Atk inson ’ s e p s i l o n , measu r ing i n e q u a l i t y a v e r s i o n p a r a m e t e r
∗ @author Amir S e p e h r i ( math ) , Gui l l aume S a i n t−J a c q u e s ( s c a l a b l e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n )
∗ /
c l a s s A t k i n s o n A g g r e g a t o r ( v a l e : Double ) e x t e n d s
org . apache . s p a r k . s q l . e x p r e s s i o n s . U s e r D e f i n e d A g g r e g a t e F u n c t i o n {
/∗∗ i n p u t schema of UDAF ∗ /
o v e r r i d e d e f inpu tSchema : org . apache . s p a r k . s q l . t y p e s . S t r u c t T y p e =
S t r u c t T y p e ( S t r u c t F i e l d ( " v a l u e " , DoubleType ) : : N i l )
/∗∗ b u f f e r i n t e r n a l f i e l d s :
∗ N : number o f o b s e r v a t i o n s
∗ S : sum of o b s e r v a t i o n s
∗ S1me : sum of o b s e r v a t i o n s t o t h e power o f 1−e p s i l o n
∗ S2m2e : sum of o b s e r v a t i o n s t o t h e power o f 2 − 2 e p s i l o n
∗ S2me : sum of o b s e r v a t i o n s t o t h e power o f 2−e p s i l o n
∗ S2 : sum of o b s e r v a t i o n s t o t h e power o f 2
∗ /
o v e r r i d e d e f bu f f e rSchema : S t r u c t T y p e = S t r u c t T y p e (
S t r u c t F i e l d ( "N" , LongType ) : :
S t r u c t F i e l d ( " S " , DoubleType ) : :
S t r u c t F i e l d ( " S1me " , DoubleType ) : :
S t r u c t F i e l d ( " S2m2e " , DoubleType ) : :
S t r u c t F i e l d ( " S2me " , DoubleType ) : :
S t r u c t F i e l d ( " S2 " , DoubleType ) : : N i l )
/∗∗ o u t p u t Schema :
∗ − N i s t h e number o f o b s e r v a t i o n
∗ − a t k i n s o n I n d e x i s t h e At k i n s o n Index
∗ − sigmaSq i s t h e e s t i m a t e d v a r i a n c e o f t h e a t k i o s n Index
∗ /
o v e r r i d e d e f da taType : DataType = S t r u c t T y p e (
S t r u c t F i e l d ( "N" , DoubleType ) : :
S t r u c t F i e l d ( " a t k i n s o n I n d e x " , DoubleType ) : :
S t r u c t F i e l d ( " sigmaSq " , DoubleType ) : : N i l )
/∗∗ t h i s i s a d e t e r m i n i s t i c a l g o r i t h m ∗ /
o v e r r i d e d e f d e t e r m i n i s t i c : Boolean = t r u e
/∗∗ a l l a c c u m u l a t o r s i n i t i a l i z e d a t z e r o ∗ /
o v e r r i d e d e f i n i t i a l i z e ( b u f f e r : M u t a b l e A g g r e g a t i o n B u f f e r ) : Un i t = {
b u f f e r ( 0 ) = 0L
b u f f e r ( 1 ) = 0 . 0
b u f f e r ( 2 ) = 0 . 0
b u f f e r ( 3 ) = 0 . 0
b u f f e r ( 4 ) = 0 . 0
b u f f e r ( 5 ) = 0 . 0
}
/∗∗ a c c u m u l a t o r u p d a t e f u n c t i o n when p r e s e n t e d wi th new d a t a ∗ /
o v e r r i d e d e f u p d a t e ( b u f f e r : M u t a b l e A g g r e g a t i o n B u f f e r , i n p u t : Row ) : Un i t = {
v a l x = i n p u t . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 0 )
b u f f e r ( 0 ) = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Long ] ( 0 ) + 1
b u f f e r ( 1 ) = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 1 ) + x
b u f f e r ( 2 ) = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 2 ) + Math . pow ( x , 1 − e )
b u f f e r ( 3 ) = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 3 ) + Math . pow ( x , 2 − 2 ∗ e )
b u f f e r ( 4 ) = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 4 ) + Math . pow ( x , 2 − e )
b u f f e r ( 5 ) = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 5 ) + Math . pow ( x , 2 )
}
/∗∗ b u f f e r merge f u n c t i o n ∗ /
o v e r r i d e d e f merge ( b u f f e r 1 : M u t a b l e A g g r e g a t i o n B u f f e r , b u f f e r 2 : Row ) : Un i t = {
b u f f e r 1 ( 0 ) = b u f f e r 1 . ge tAs [ Long ] ( 0 ) + b u f f e r 2 . ge tAs [ Long ] ( 0 )
b u f f e r 1 ( 1 ) = b u f f e r 1 . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 1 ) + b u f f e r 2 . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 1 )
b u f f e r 1 ( 2 ) = b u f f e r 1 . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 2 ) + b u f f e r 2 . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 2 )
b u f f e r 1 ( 3 ) = b u f f e r 1 . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 3 ) + b u f f e r 2 . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 3 )
b u f f e r 1 ( 4 ) = b u f f e r 1 . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 4 ) + b u f f e r 2 . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 4 )
b u f f e r 1 ( 5 ) = b u f f e r 1 . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 5 ) + b u f f e r 2 . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 5 )
}
/∗∗ when a c c u m u l a t i o n i s over , compute t h e a c t u a l i n d e x and v a r i a n c e
∗
∗ @param b u f f e r t h e a c c u m u l a t o r s
∗ @return t h r e e t e r m s : number o f o b s e r v a t i o n s , a t k i n s o n Index , v a r i a n c e o f i n d e x
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∗ /
o v e r r i d e d e f e v a l u a t e ( b u f f e r : Row ) : Any = {
/∗∗ number o f o b s e r v a t i o n s ∗ /
v a l N = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Long ] ( 0 ) . t oDoub le
/∗∗ a v e r a g e ∗ /
v a l S = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 1 ) / N
/∗∗ a v e r a g e o f t e r m s r a i s e d t o t h e power o f 1 − e p s i l o n ∗ /
v a l S1me = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 2 ) / N
/∗∗ a v e r a g e o f t e r m s r a i s e d t o t h e power o f 2 − 2 e p s i l o n ∗ /
v a l S2m2e = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 3 ) / N
/∗∗ a v e r a g e o f t e r m s r a i s e d t o t h e power o f 2−e p s i l o n ∗ /
v a l S2me = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 4 ) / N
/∗∗ a v e r a g e o f t e r m s r a i s e d t o t h e power o f 2 ∗ /
v a l S2 = b u f f e r . ge tAs [ Double ] ( 5 ) / N
/∗∗ a c t u a l A t k i n s o n Index ∗ /
v a l a t k i n s o n I n d e x = 1 − ( Math . pow ( S1me , 1 / (1 − e ) ) / S )
/∗∗ f i r s t t e rm of var−c o v a r m a t r i x ∗ /
v a l S11 = S2m2e − Math . pow ( S1me , 2 )
/∗∗ second te rm of var−c o v a r m a t r i x ∗ /
v a l S12 = S2me − S ∗ S1me
/∗∗ t h i r d te rm of var−c o v a r m a t r i x ∗ /
v a l S22 = S2 − Math . pow ( S , 2 )
/∗∗ f i n a l e s t i m a t e d v a r i a n c e o f t h e A tk i n s o n Index ∗ /
v a l sigmaSq = (
S11 ∗ Math . pow ( S1me , 2 ∗ e / (1 − e ) ) / ( Math . pow (1 − e , 2 ) ∗ Math . pow ( S , 2 ) )
− 2 ∗ S12 ∗ Math . pow ( S1me , (1 + e ) / (1 − e ) ) / ( ( 1 − e ) ∗ Math . pow ( S , 3 ) )
+ S22 ∗ Math . pow ( S1me , 2 / (1 − e ) ) / Math . pow ( S , 4 ) ) / N
(N, a t k i n s o n I n d e x , sigmaSq )
}
}
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